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“We operate every day with the knowledge that our enemies are 
changing based on how we change.”—Tom Ridge, Secretary of 
Homeland Security, March 31, 2004.1 
 
“Ben Laiden understood better than most of the volunteers the extent to 
which the continuation and eventual success of the jihad in Afghanistan 
depended on an increasingly complex, almost worldwide organization. 
This organization included a financial support network that came to be 
known as the “Golden Chain” put together mainly by financiers in Saudi 
Arabia and the Persian Gulf States. Donations flowed through charities 





A commonly held view of terrorist financing that has emerged since 
September 11, 2001, is that of a global formal and informal financial system 
that terrorists can manipulate with ease.  Diverse and dispersed sources of 
funding and methods of transferring funds are exploited by equally 
decentralized and flexible terrorist networks that can easily shift from one 
means to another in response to efforts to thwart their activities.  Terrorists are 
also believed to rely on a variety of increasingly self-contained mechanisms like 
independent criminal ventures, diversion of funds from charities, and licit 
business ventures. 3   
 
Still, considerable mystery and intrigue cloaks the financing of 
contemporary terrorist organizations, especially those originating in the Middle 
                                                 
1  Remarks by Secretary Tom Ridge, US Secretary of Homeland Security, at the Center for 
Homeland Security's 2004 Homeland and Global Security Summit, 31 March 2004; available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3411.    
2 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 55. 
3 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorist Finance and 
State Responses,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of 
Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
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East. The case of al Qaeda is typical.  We know more today than we did three 
years ago about its financial methods and structure, but we have not identified 
much about its sources of supply and funding.  And much of what we think we 
know may only be conjecture, or as the quote from Tom Ridge above suggests 
-- obsolete.  The same gap in our knowledge applied to an even greater extent 
to many of the lesser known but equally violent terrorist groups throughout 
the region.  
 
A widely cited estimate places al Qaeda spending around $30 million per 
year to sustain itself in the period preceding 9/11. “But it is even less clear what 
al Qaeda needs or expends today4.  And we still do not know with any precision 
just how much money al Qaeda raises, or how its funds are allocated5.  What 
we do know that al Qaeda has traditionally relied on Islamic charities for much 
of its funding.”  The same is true for many like minded terrorist groups 
throughout the Middle East. 
 
Charity forms a very important part of Muslim law and tradition. There is 
a recognized religious duty in the Muslim world to donate a set portion of 
one's earnings or assets to religious or charitable purposes (Zakat), and 
additionally, to support charitable works through voluntary deeds or 
contributions (Sadaqah).   
 
In countries having no established income tax system (for example, Saudi 
Arabia or the United Arab Emirates), the Zakat substitutes as the principal 
source of funding for religious, social and humanitarian organizations. Funds 
are collected by the government, local mosques or religious centers.  Sadaqah 
contributions are made directly to established Islamic charities.  Because both 
Zakat and Sadaqah are viewed as personal religious responsibilities, there has 
traditionally been little or no government oversight of these activities. 
Donations in large measure remain anonymous. Both conditions combined 
with the often opaque financial and operating structure of Islamic charities 
provide an ideal environment for exploitation by terrorist groups. 
 
Charitable organizations are also attractive targets for terrorist 
organizations because of the reluctance on the part of many countries to 
rigorously scrutinize their activities.  Often with limited information, authorities 
are put in the awkward position of being pressured to discern between 
legitimate charity organizations and activities, those organizations that are 
unknowingly used by terrorists to divert funds, and others deliberately engaged 
                                                 
4 See The 9/11 Commission Report and National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, Monograph on Terrorist Financing, 9. 
5 Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo 
and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A 
Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
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in supporting terrorist groups. Leaders of the latter organizations often raise 
funds both from individuals purposely seeking to fund terrorist groups as well 
as from innocent contributors unwitting of the group’s links to terrorists.6 
 
The sections below examine the exploitation of charities by terrorist 
groups. What ways do terrorist groups exploit these organizations? Is this 
exploitation likely to increase? If so what forms might it take? Are existing 
policies sufficient to combat these developments? If not, how might the U.S. 
and other like-minded countries counter the evolving methods terrorists use to 
advance their cause through the exploitation of charities?  
Islamic Charities 
 While each the world’s major religions place a high degree of 
importance on charitable acts and charitable giving, Islam gives charity an 
especially high place among the tenets of the faith.  Charitable giving in the 
form of Zakat is one of the five pillars of the faith, a donation equal to 2.5 
percent of annual income is required for all Muslims who have resources 
remaining after meeting the basic requirements of their family. While Zakat is 
the only required form of charity, additional voluntary giving is strongly 
encouraged, and takes various forms such as infak (a voluntary gift fro a 
restricted purpose) and sadaqah (voluntary charity for unrestricted purposes).  
 
The important role assigned to charity has led Islamic societies to 
develop a specialized set of institutions for managing charitable donations and, 
in some cases for managing the institutions that receive religious charitable 
proceeds.  These institutions fall roughly into two categories.  The first category 
managed charitable resources contributed (waqf) by a single individual (or 
more rarely, a family) either during his/her life or as part of a bequest. The 
funds falling in this category are usually dedicated to a specific purpose or set 
of purposes such as funding a mosque or hospital, wile others serve more 
diverse purposes, including supporting the donor’s family. 
 
The second category, typified by the zekat fund, solicits and collects gifts 
from many individuals and then aggregates these funds for charitable 
purposes. The resulting funds are often on-granted directly to needy 
individuals, to nonprofit organizations that deliver services to the poor or 
provide other social services, or to other appropriate recipients. Some funds, by 
contrast, establish and operate such service delivery organizations themselves, 
such as hospitals, or schools.  
                                                 
6 Matthew A. Levitt, “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 6:4(December 2002), p.54. 
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Basic Dilemma 
The primary function of Islamic charities is to provide basic goods and 
services to communities in a manner deemed consistent with the values and 
teachings of Islam. This includes medical services through local clinics and 
hospitals, K-12 schools, universities and colleges, orphanages, vocational 
training centers, subsidies for poor families, and other grassroots activities. 
Islamic charities also collect donations to help Muslims outside their own 
country in places such as the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, Chechnya, and 
Kashmir.  
 
Donations of this type have created problems for law enforcement in the 
war on terrorism because of the difficulty of determining whether money 
collected for a particular cause (helping the Palestinians rebuild their cities after 
the recent Israeli incursions, for example) is actually used for the originally 
specified purpose. In this sense diverting money through charities to terrorist 
organizations differs fundamentally from that of money laundering:7 
 
The criminal phenomenon of money laundering can be described in 
practical terms.  In the case of terrorist financing through the exploitation 
of charities, however, only the theory is clear: it is the reverse of money 
laundering.  While money laundering is concerned with laundering assets 
of illegal origin and bringing them back into legal economic circulation, 
charity-based financing of terrorism is concerned with using legal assets 
for an illegal activity, namely terrorist attacks.  In other words, with money 
laundering the illegal activity can be located at the beginning of the 
process whereas in terrorism financing the entire process is reversed. 
 
Governments in the Middle East have shown great creativity and 
resourcefulness at preventing charities from raising money to overthrow them, 
but they are far less effective in making sure that money is not "redirected" 
once it leaves the country.  
 
In some cases, Islamic charities have explicitly raised money for causes 
that threaten current U.S. government policy. Many Muslims, for example, 
especially those in the Middle East, view movements such as Hamas and 
Hizballah as national liberation movements, not terrorist organizations. As a 
result, Islamic charities have solicited funds for what they term "resistance to 
the Israeli occupation."  
 
But Hamas and Hizballah are fundamentally different from al-Qaeda. 
They are nationalist Islamic movements that operate hospitals and schools, 
oversee charities, and run in local elections. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, is a 
                                                 
7 Michael Lauber, “Financing Terror: An Overview,” Terrorism Monitor 2:20 (October 21, 2004). 
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transnational revolutionary movement. Few Islamic charities publicly call for 
donations to groups like al-Qaeda. Even al-Qaeda fronts do not openly request 
money for violent activities. Instead, they seek donations for general charitable 
calls and only later siphon the money to terrorist operations. 
 
The vast majority of Islamic charities, however, represent moderate 
Islamic interests and seek to implement the Quranic injunction to help others in 
need. In a sense, Islamic charities provide Muslims with an opportunity to put 
into practice the commands of God and fulfill their duties as Muslims. It is also 
seen as a way of demonstrating that "Islam is the solution" (a common Islamist 
campaign slogan) to a myriad of widespread social ills. Islamic charities provide 
a visible example of how Islam can be put to work to improve society and 
alleviate socioeconomic stagnation in the Muslim world. 
Charity Exploitation by Terrorist Groups 
Following the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. and allied counterterrorism agencies 
turned their scrutiny to Muslim charities -- resulting in the eventual closures of 
several. For some of the reasons noted above, these have been difficult cases 
for the government.  In large part this stems from the fact that the Islamic 
charities fall into two categories: those that have had their funds unknowingly 
diverted and those that have been corrupted and act as fronts.8 
 
Several conceptual problems arise in assessing the extent to which 
Islamic charities have been exploited by terrorist groups.  Clearly the direct 
financial support of terrorist groups and their operations are clear-cut cases. On 
the other hand money is quiet fungible and some charity organizers are adept 
at creating gray areas.  A good example of this gray area is the Muslim World 
League (MWL) founded by Saudi Arabia in Mecca in 1962. The Saudi 
government provided the MWL with generous funding and charged it with the 
support and propagation of Wahhabi Islam.  In turn the MWL supported 
institutions outside of Saudi Arabia, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
Southeast Asia and the Middle East.  The organization also became active in 
Europe–including countries of the former Soviet Union–and North America.  
Saudi public and private support for these activities has been estimated at over 
                                                 
8 See the 9/11 Commission report;  Also see Maurice R. Greenberg, chair, Terrorist Financing: 
Report of an Independent Task Force, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003; and 
Matthew A. Levitt, "The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism," Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, vol. 6, no. 4, 49-65. Levitt M. 2002b. Combating Terrorist Financing, 
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$75 billion during the last four decades.9 Many experts have drawn a link 
between this conversion effort and the rise in appeal of al Qaeda throughout 
the Muslim world. The line from Wahhabism to jihadism is a very thin one that 
is easily crossed, both religiously and intellectually. 10 
 
A not so gray area, but still one not falling in the category of direct 
support to terrorist groups.  For example Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development in Texas raised $13 million in the United States in 2000 claiming 
that the money it solicited went to care for needy Palestinians, although 
evidence shows that Hamas used some of the money that the Foundation 
raised to support suicide bombers and their families.11 
 
It is usually difficult to prove that a charity actually was founded with 
the intention of supporting terrorist groups, or that officials knowingly did so. 
As a result, counterterrorism officials and many Muslim donors are left virtually 
grasping at straws and seeking novel ways at overcoming the fungability 
problem – halting the flow of money to the direct or indirect support of 
terrorist groups..12  
 
Investigators have few tools to help them distinguish between legitimate 
and illegitimate organizations, but some clues -- such as the charity's national 
origins -- can be helpful.  Though certainly not fool-proof, another possible 
starting point for identifying unscrupulous charities is to search for those that 
are issues-based, rather than more general, charitable organizations. For 
example, a group whose ideological purpose is to donate monies to the plight 
of the Palestinian people is far more likely to funnel money to Hamas, simply 
on the strength of its more intimate relationship with the region and groups 
involved with the same issue, than a group with a more global focus -- such as 
the Islamic Circle of North America, which has provided relief to people in 
Sudan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and to victims of Hurricane Francis. That is not to 
say that issues-based groups are corrupt and general charities are not, but it is 
one possible indicator that law enforcement agencies can monitor. 13  
 
Accountants and financial investigators also can watch for anomalies. 
For instance, if an issue-specific charity donates a disproportionate amount to a 
                                                 
9 Statement of David D. Aufhauser, Former U.S. Treasury Department General Counsel,  before 
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: "An Assessment of Current Efforts to Combat 
Terrorism Financing," June, 15 2004. 
10 Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo 
and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A 
Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
11 Terrorist Financing: On Deterring Terrorist Operations in the United States (U.S. GAO, 2005), 
p. 14. 
12 Jeremy Lippart and Karan Bokhari, “The Finances of Terrorism, Stratfor, October 22, 2004.  
13 Ibid.  
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seemingly unrelated issue or group, it likely would raise red flags for an 
investigator. Other anomalies in giving patterns could include new areas of 
concern for a general-purpose charity, signs that a U.S.-based charity is 
ignoring local causes in favor of funding trans-national relief efforts, or an 
organization that is recruiting volunteers to act on its behalf outside the 
group's traditional -- either geographic and ideological -- area of responsibility. 
This method of monitoring -- recommended by the Financial Action Task Force 
on Money Laundering and adopted by the United Nations -- has resulted in 
several arrests. 
 
Clearly, however, clues are not proof of any illegal behavior. When it 
comes to charities suspected of terrorist involvement, at what point can a series 
of independent actions be said to indicate coordinated and malevolent intent? 
And if they do in fact indicate such intent, what should be done about it? In all 
cases, further investigation would be needed in order to support the case for 
an arrest warrant or subpoena that eventually could be used to put the charity 
out of business.  
 
As a way of organization, the main sources of terrorist funding are 
outlined in Figure 1. Here charities are assumed to play a key role, with funds 
also derived from legitimate businesses and fraudulent/criminal activities. The 
following cases illustrate the varying ways that Islamic charities have been 
exploited by terrorist groups.14 
Examples of Terrorist Exploitations of Charities—Al-Qaeda-Type 
As noted above there are fundamental differences between the manner 
in which Hamas and Hizballah exploit charities and the methods used by Al-
Qaeda.  Many of the charitable and service organizations serving as fronts for 
al Qaeda grew out of the network of organizations established in the 1980s to 
provide funding, materiel, recruits and more to the mujahideen fighting the 
Soviets in Afghanistan.  
 
Although most of these charities perform the humanitarian tasks for 
which they were originally created, a significant amount of money has been 
diverted, directly or indirectly to fund terrorism. In fact, the 9/11 Commission 
pointed to a core number of financial facilitators involved in raising, moving 
and storing the money al Qaeda has needed for its maintenance, logistical and 
operational requirements.  They raised funds from donors primarily in the Gulf 
region, but also from other countries around the world.  Using bogus and 
legitimate charities and businesses as covers, they enabled al Qaeda to develop 
a substantial financial network in Southeast Asia, Europe, Africa and Asia.  
                                                 
14 These cases are taken from the U.S. Treasury’s List of Charities Designated Under Executive 
Order 13224 and can be found at: http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-
issues/protecting/charities_execorder_13224-a.shtml#a  
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Figure 1 



































Al Qaeda has taken full advantage of the lack of oversight noted above 
to open its own front charities and to solicit funds through collection boxes at 
mosques and Islamic centers. It has also placed operatives in key positions 
within established charities to do its bidding.   Funds raised for or allocated by 
al Qaeda are co-mingled, maintained, and transferred with funds designated 
for legitimate relief and developmental activities. Their ultimate use to support 
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al Qaeda becomes known only once the monies are transferred or diverted to al 
Qaeda-related recipients. 15  
 
Terrorist exploitation of such charities is of particular concern because, 
as one commentator observed, “The operation under tax-exempt status in the 
United States of organizations that actively fund terrorist activities abroad, has 
meant that the U.S. government, and all U.S. tax payers, indirectly finance 
terrorists and terrorist organizations.”16  
Al Akhtar Trust 
Al Akhtar Trust is a Pakistani based charity known to have provided 
support to al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan.  Al Akhtar is carrying on the 
activities of the previously designated Al Rashid Trust (ART).  Al Rashid was 
established as a welfare organization in Karachi in February 1996 by Mufti 
Muhammad Rashid.  ART actively promoted jihad. “The holy war is an essential 
element of Islam,” wrote Muhammad Rashid. “Any Moslem must carry 
weapons, even in the mosque, if the need would be felt to make fire on a not-
Moslem.”17 
 
Rashid and his organization18 had close ties to the Taliban, to Osama bin 
Laden, and to al-Qaeda, as well as to other Islamist organizations in Pakistan.  
The charity ran many madrasas and mosques in both Afghanistan and Pakistan 
– all used to recruit jihadis. ART not only had established networks of hospitals 
and clinics to treat wounded terrorists, but also provided financial and legal 
support to jailed Islamists around the world.  On the other hand, ART also 
operated a network of bakeries (with an annual budget estimated at $4 
million) that provided the organization with further income, employment for 
the locals, and bread for the poor. 
 
While our data on ART is quite sketchy Pakistani sources claim that in 
2000, the Trust sent $750,000 in cash to Islamists in Chechnya, $36,000 to 
Islamists in Kosovo, and $34,482 to the Taliban. In addition, ART was reported 
to support Islamist terrorism in Kashmir, India and Central Asia.  
 
Moreover, the organization shipped at lest U.S.$1 million worth of 
goods, food, medicine and other relief items into Afghanistan on a weekly 
                                                 
15 Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo 
and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A 
Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
16 Quoted in Todd M. Hinnen, “The Cyper-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use 
of the Internet,” The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review V (2004), p.18. 
17 Muhammad Rashid, translated in “Al Rashid Trust,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
www.satp.org 
18 The following draws on Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil (Chicago: Bonus Books,  2003), pp. 
43-44. 
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basis and sent more then 70 truckloads of relief goods up to November 2001.  
These truckloads turned out also to have been used for smuggling heavy 
weapons and ammunition—disguised as food relief—to the Taliban and al-
Qaeda. In December 2002 Pakistani intelligence sources were quoted as saying, 
“It’s nonsense to believe this has stopped.”19 
 
ART’s successor, Al Akhtar, is suspected of raising money for jihad in Iraq 
as well as having ties to the individuals responsible for the kidnapping and 
murder of Wall Street Journal Reporter Daniel Pearl. The Trust has provided 
financial and logistical support as well as arranging travel for Islamic 
extremists.20 
Al Haramain Foundation (AHF) 
Al Haramain, a Saudi Arabia-based nonprofit organization established in 
the early 1990, has been described as the “United Way” of Saudi Arabia.  It 
exists to promote Wahhabi Islam by funding religious education, mosques, and 
humanitarian projects worldwide. At its peak, al Haramain had a presence in at 
least 50 countries.  Estimates of its budget range from $30 to $80 million. 21 
 
When viewed as a single entity, AHF is one of the principal Islamic NGOs 
providing support for the al Qaida network and promoting militant Islamic 
doctrine worldwide. Terrorist organizations designated by the U.S. including 
Jemmah Islammiya, Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, HAMAS and 
Lashkar E-Taibah received funding from AHF and used AHF as a front for 
fundraising and operational activities. 
 
On March 11, 2002 the U.S. and Saudi Arabia jointly designated the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia offices of Haramain as al Qaeda funding 
sources. Al Haramain Somalia had funneled money to Al-Ittihad al-Islami, a 
designated terrorist group, by disguising the funds as contributions for an 
orphanage project, an Islamic school, and mosque construction.22 
 
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, AHF activities 
supporting terrorism in Afghanistan continued. In 2002, activities included 
involvement with a group trained to attack foreigners in Afghanistan. A 
journalist suspected of meeting with al Qaida and Taliban members in 
Afghanistan was reportedly transferring funds on behalf of the al Qaida-
                                                 
19 Ehrenfeld, op. cit., p. 44. 
20 U.S. Treasury, Office of Public Affairs, “U.S. Designates Al Akhtar Trust: Pakistani Based 
Charity is Suspected of Raising Money for Terrorists in Iraq,”  October 14, 2003. 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js899.htm 
21 John Roth, Douglas Greenburg and Serena Wille, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States, Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report of the Commission. 
2005, p. 114, 
22 22 See United Nations Press Release SC/7331, dated March 15, 2002. 
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affiliated AHF and forwarding videotapes from al Qaida leaders to an Arabic 
language TV network for broadcast. 
 
In late 2004 the Saudi government dissolved the Al Haramain 
Foundation.  U.S. investigators had linked a former Al Haramain employee to 
the 1998 U.S. embassy boming in Tanzania. Since March 2002 the United 
Stgates and Saudi Arabia had jointly designatged 11 overseas branches of Al 
Haramain as front organizations for terrorist activities.  Saudi officials indicate 
that Al Haramain’s international operations will be absorbed by the new 
Nongovernmental Commission for Relief and Charity Work Abroad.23 
The Muslim World League (MLW) 
As noted above, the Muslim World league24 was founded by, and is 
completely funded by the Saudi government.  Since its inception in 1962, it has 
expanded into at least one hundred branches in more than thirty countries. It 
branch in Hurndon, Virginia was raided in March 2002 and closed by federal 
authorities.  Ironically Saleh al-Obaid, former head of the MLW and a hardcore 
Wahhabi was recently made education minister in Saudi Arabia.25 
 
MWL is also the main body for other Saudi charities such as IIRO, Rabita 
Trust, and the SAAR Foundation Network.  It is supported by the Saudi 
government money and by the al-Rajhi and the bin Mahfouz families’ global 
financial and business empires. Saudi public and private support for for MLW 
has been estimated at over $75 billion during the last four decades.26   
 
The Pakistani branch of the MWL was created to support al-Qaeda. It 
was funded initially by Osama bin Laden, and later by the Saudi government. 
MWL’s chief officers in Pakistan have had close ties to Osama bin Laden, and 
have supported some of al-Qaeda’s operations, including attempts to obtain 
nuclear materials.  
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) 
 The Benevolence International Foundation is another Saudi umbrella 
charity organization that helps fund al Qaeda. Benevolence was established in 
the late 1980s as two separate organizations.  The Islamic Benevolence 
Committee, was a charity based in Peshawar, Pakistan, and Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia. Its sister organization, Benevolence International Corporation, was set 
                                                 
23 Alfred B Prados and Christopher Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2005), pp. 18-19. 
24 The following draws on Ehrenfeld, op. cit., p. 38. 
25 Oliver Guitta, “A Nation at Risk,” The Weekly Standard 10:27 (April 4, 2005), pp. 17-18. 
26 See statement of David D. Aufhauser, Former U.S. Treasury Department General Council, 
before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs: “An Assessment of Current Efforts to 
Combat Terrorism Financing,” June 15, 2004. 
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up as an import/export business in the Philippines. Both organizations were 
engaged in fund-raising efforts for the mujahideen in Afghanistan, but they 
appeared to work separately until the early 1990s.  In 1992 they became the 
Benevolence International Foundation and opened new branches throughout 
Southeast Asia, Europe, and America.  
  
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF-USA), incorporated in the 
State of Illinois in 1992, was a U.S., tax-exempt, not-for-profit organization 
whose stated purpose was to conduct humanitarian relief projects throughout 
the world. The organization has been linked to efforts to purchase rockets, 
mortars, rifles, and offensive and defensive bombs, and to distribute them to 
various mujahideen camps, including camps operated by al Qaida. 
 
BIF also provided additional support for and has been linked in other 
ways to al Qaida and its operatives. First, BIF lent direct logistical support in 
1998 to Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a bin Laden lieutenant present at the 
founding of al Qaida. Salim has been indicted for conspiring to kill U.S. 
nationals. Testimony at the 2001 trial of United States v. Bin Laden, et al, 
implicated Salim in efforts to develop chemical weapons on behalf of al Qaida 
in the 1990s. As early as 1992, Salim and bin Laden made efforts to develop 
conventional weapons and to obtain nuclear weapons components.  
 
The case against BIF is particularly noteworthy because it uncovered the 
illegal and yet virtually undetectable ability of Al Qaeda to pull funds from its 
charities. Funds would be allocated, and accounted for, by the charity for 
community development and charitable activities. Once the full amount was 
pulled out for the charitable project, a small percentage (around 10%) of the 
cash was skimmed off the top and physically passed on to an Al Qaeda 
operative who deposited this clean money into Al Qaeda accounts in the 
Middle East or dispersed into operational cells in other parts where Al Qaeda 
operates such as Bosnia.27  Mechanisms such as this skimming operation are 
especially beneficial to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations because the 
money that is received from charities is clean money, and unlike illicit financing 
sources does not need to be laundered. 
The Qatar Charitable Society (QCS) 
 The Qatar Charitable Society (QCS) illustrates how a terrorist 
organization can infiltrate a legitimate charity and exploit its funding base. At 
the trial of the conspirators who planned the bombings of the U.S. Embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania, a former Al Qaeda member and QCS employee 
                                                 
27 “Government’s Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-Conspirator 
Statements,” pp. 65-74. 
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identified QCS as an Al-Qaeda front and financial conduit for militant jihadists 
world-wide.28  
  
QCS’s mission statement on its website did not foreshadow such 
involvement: “QCS aims to offer relief to help to orphans, victims of war and 
disasters by supporting them financially, socially and culturally up to the age of 
18. QCS aids widows to meet living expenses particularly those who lost all 
relatives and friends.29  QCS draws much of its funding from official sources, 
including the Qatari government.  
 
 QCS’s activity in the Southern Caucasus illustrates the manner in which 
the charity has aided terrorist causes. In 1995 a QCS office in Daghestan 
dispensed 3 million Qatari Rials in less than two years. Daghestani state police 
initiated an inquiry into the organization, and uncovered forged documents 
and invoices detailing hundreds of thousands of dollars of illicit financial 
transactions.  From the evidence they collected, investigators estimated that 
QCS had given up to $1 million to unspecified Chechen extremists. Russian 
authorities found  most of the charitable contributions  were not recorded 
anywhere. The same goes for how the money was distributed. 
 
 By liquidating charity bank accounts into untraceable cash withdrawals 
in war-torn states (often with no reliable banking systems), QCS was able to 
make this money simply disappear. When questioned on this the Qatari Foreign 
Minister’s reply illustrates why charities are often sought out by terrorist 
groups:30 
 
We as a government cannot control the aid going abroad, some of 
which may go for humanitarian goals, and some may start out 
humanitarian but end up in another way. However there is no 
monitoring because people are sympathizing…. We as a government 
may be able to control our sympathy, although in the end we are human 
beings and Muslims .... therefore we cannot restrain the people’s 
feelings in this regard.  
                                                 
28 See Fund-Raising Methods and Procedures for International Terrorist Organizations, Hearing 
Before the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, Feb12, 2002 (Testimony of Steven Emerson quoting Transcript of Trial 
Testimony, Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl, United States v. Bin Laden, 329-30 (February 6, 2001)), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/02102se.pdf. 
29 QCharity at www.qcharity.org/qenglish/index.html 
30 Quote from Steven Emerson and Jonathan Levin Before the United States Senate Committee 
on Governmental Affairs, “Terrorism Financing: Origination, Organization and Prevention: Saudi 
Arabia, Terrorist Financing and the War on Terror,” July 31, 2003, p. 
DRAFT – November 28, 2005 NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION –  
14 of 48 
Global Relief Foundation (GRF) 
The Global Relief Foundation (GRF) is another charity with links to  al 
Qaida, and other known terrorist groups. In addition, GRF provided financial 
and other assistance to, and received funding from, individuals associated with 
al Qaida, including Mohammed Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi. Zouaydi is a suspected 
financier of al Qaida’s worldwide terrorist efforts and was arrested in Europe in 
April 2002. Spain’s Interior Ministry has described transfers totaling about 
$600,000 from Zouaydi and his partners to al Qaida-related organizations, 
including GRF.  
 
GRF has admitted receiving funds from Zouaydi, including over $200,000 
to Nabil Sayadi, Head of FSM, GRF’s Belgium office. GRF and FSM personnel 
had multiple contacts with Wadih El-Hage, bin Laden’s personal secretary when 
bin Laden was in Sudan. El-Hage was convicted in a U.S. district court in May 
2001 for participating in a conspiracy to kill United States nationals, which 
conspiracy included, among other acts, the 1998 bombings of the U.S. 
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.  
 
GRF has published several Arabic newsletters and pamphlets that 
advocated armed action through jihad against groups perceived to be un-
Islamic. A GRF newsletter requested donations “for equipping the raiders, for 
the purchase of ammunition and food, and for their [the Mujahideen’s] 
transportation so that they can raise God the Almighty’s word . . .” GRF also 
received $18,521 from the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development 
(HLF) in 2000. HLF, a Dallas, Texas based Islamic charitable organization, was 
designated under E.O. 13224 on December 4, 2001, and under the European 
Union’s Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on June 17, 2002, for its ties to 
terrorism.  
The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) 
The International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is another Wahhabi 
sponsored charity31. Established in 1978, it has branch offices throughout the 
world, including 36 in Africa, 24 in Asia, 10 in Europe and 10 in Latin America, 
the Caribbean, and North America. The bulk of its financial contributions come 
from private donations in Saudi Arabia, including a long-standing endowment 
fund (Sanabil al-Khair) which generates a stable income for its various activities. 
The IIRO continues to be closely associated with the Muslim World League. 
Prominent Middle East figures and financiers have supported this mainstream 
Islamic charity.32   
 
                                                 
31 The following draws on Comaras, op. cit. 
32 Second Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1363 (2001) and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003) on 
sanctions against al Qaeda, S/2003/1070 dated 3 December 2003, paragraphs 40 – 43. 
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According to a CIA report, funds raised through the International Islamic 
Relief Organization were used to support at least six al Qaeda training camps in 
Afghanistan prior to 9/11.33  Evidence produced in Canadian court proceedings 
linked the IIRO directly to groups responsible for the 1998 bombings of the 
American embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.34  The former head of the 
IIRO office in the Philippines, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa, was also accused of 
links to al Qaeda and terrorist activities.35   
 
At one point the IIRO used more than 70 percent of its funds to 
purchase weapons, thereby securing its status as a front fro al-Qaeda’s illegal 
activities (the rest of the funds were used for legitimate public works).  The IIRO 
has also directly funded the Egyptian branch of al-Qaeda. In addition the IIRO 
has been identified as a conspirator in:36  
 
x The 1993 World Trade Center bombing. 
x Plots to destroy the bridges and tunnels of New York City. 
x An attempt to blow up twelve American airlines simultaneously. 
 
The IIR was also involved in a conspiracy to assassinate former president 
Clinton and Pope John Paul II.37 
 
IIRO’s current Secretary General, Dr. Adnan Khaleel Pasha, has sought to 
clean house and steer clear of any links to al Qaeda.  Under his direction, 
however, the IIRO continues to provide direct support to Hamas activists.38 
The Rabita Trust 
The Rabita Trust39, begun in Pakistan in 1988, ostensibly worked to 
repatriate and rehabilitate stranded Pakistanis from Bangladesh.  Its stated 
aims were to disseminate Dawah (culture), to expound the teachings of Islam, 
“and to ‘defend’ Islamic causes in a manner that safeguards the interests and 
aspirations of Muslims, solves their problems, refutes false allegations against 
Islam, and repels inimical trends and dogma which the enemies of Islam seek to 
                                                 
33 This CIA report was released under a Freedom of Information request. Extracts from the text 
of the report are available on the internet at www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/cia96charities.pdf 
34 See Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Mahmoud Jaballah, Federal Court of Canada, 
Docket DES-6-99, November 2, 1999. 
35 See Philippine Country Report, UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and 1455, al Qaeda 
Sanctions Committee, October, 2004, S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/79, October 22, 2003. 
36 Ehrenfeld, op. cit., p. 34. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See “Saudi Royal Family’s Financial Support to the Palestinians, 1998-2003:  More than 15 
billion Rials ($4 Billion U.S. ) Given to ‘Mujahideen Fighters’ and ‘Families of Martyrs by Steven 
Stalinsky, MEMRI Special Report 17, July 3, 2003. 
39 The following draws on Comras, op. cit. 
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exploit in order to destroy the unity of Muslims and to sow seeds of doubt in 
the Muslim brethren.”40   
 
Members of the trust included both Pakistani and Saudi, including 
Pakistan’s Ministers of Finance and Interior, Saudi Prince Talal ibn Abdul Aziz, 
Secretary Generals of the Muslim World League and the International Islamic 
Relief Organization, and President of the Council of Saudi Chamber of 
Commerce.  Most of its funding was secured from Saudi businessmen. Funds 
from the trust reportedly were used for a number of al Qaeda related activities, 
including recruitment and training in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.41 
Saudi High Commission (SHC) 
Another Saudi charity is the Saudi High Commission, AKA the Saudi High 
Relief Commission, which was founded by King Fahd’s son Prince Salman bin 
Abd al-Aziz al-Saud in 1993.42 The exact amount of money the SHC has raised is 
unknown. What is known is that money the SHC claimed it sent to aid needy 
Muslims never reached them – not the $200 million that was sent to Bosnia-
Herzegovina for the Muslims of Srebrenicia in July 1995 , and not the $600 
million that was sent to help rebuild the battered region following its civil war. 
 
When NATO forces raided the SHC offices in Sarajevo, they found a 
computer hard drive containing photographs of: the World Trade Center before 
and after the September 11attack; the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; 
and the USS Cole—as well as photographs and maps of Washington, D.C., with 
government buildings marked.  NATO forces also found:43 
 
x Information about the use of pesticides and crop dusters to disperse 
chemical weapons and biological agents. 
x Instructions on how to forge State Department IDs. 
x Anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. propaganda designed for children. 
x Close to $210,000 worth of local currency. 
x Twenty-four vehicles with diplomatic plates that had been used to 
smuggle people and materiel into Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
The NATO forces also found that the SHC branch in Sarajevo was 
employing an al-Qaeda operative, Sabir Lamar.  He and five other operateives 
                                                 
40 See South Asia Terrorism Portal at 
www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terrorstoutfits/Rabita trust.htm. 
41 See US Treasury Press Release PO-3397 dated September 6, 2002, Treasury Department 
Statement on the Designation of Wa’el Hamza Julidan. 
42 The following draws on Ehrenfeld, pp. 42-43. 
43 Matthew Levitt, “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 6:4 (December 2002). 
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from Algeria had been involved in a plot to attack the U.S. and U.K. embassies 
in Bosnia-Hersdzegovina. 
 
A subsequent audit of the SHC’s Sarajevo office by the financial police of 
the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Finance revealed that its 
founder, Prince Salman, had “knowingly failed to take appropriate actions 
regarding the management and use of funds of the SHC in Bosnia 
Herzegovina.”  In addition, the investigation found that the SHC failed to 
account for $41 million that was missing from the SHC operating funds.44 
 
These are but a few of the charities that al Qaeda has used to support 
indoctrination, recruitment, training efforts, logistical maintenance, and 
terrorist activities. The current status of many of these charities is unclear.  
Some of them remain in operation. The International Islamic Relief 
Organization has new top leadership in Saudi Arabia, but many of its local 
chapters retain their past management and structure.  Likewise branches of al 
Haramian, despite closing orders from Saudi Arabia, continue to be active in 
many countries, including Somalia and Indonesia. Other closed charities have 
merely reopened under new names.45 
 
Many of the charities that have been designated are deeply embedded in 
the social and humanitarian fabric of the communities they serve. 46 They 
provide critical services that are not easily replaced.47  In some cases, the 
charities, as well as their sponsors, may be innocent of any wrongdoing; they 
may simply have been victims of infiltration and abuse.48  In others, however, 
the charities only functioned as fronts to hide terrorism related financing.49  
                                                 
44 Ehrenfeld, op. cit., p. 43. 
45 Comras, op. cit. 
46 Comras, op. cit. 
47 One example is Lajnat al Daawa Al Islamiya (LDI), a Kuwait charity active in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.   Although it had been linked with al Qaeda, its activities were considered critical 
to ongoing Afghan relief activities.  The charity ran five medical clinics, three Islamic schools, 
and an orphanage in different parts of Pakistan. At the time, the UN Special Representative to 
the Secretary General for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahami, indicated that, given the important 
role that LDI has played in Afghan relief activities, some consideration should be taken to de-
listing this charity.  While Lajnat al Daawa Al Islamiya (LDI) remains on the UN designated list, it 
is still believed to be active in Kuwait, Pakistan and Afghanistan.  See Second Report of the 
Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1363 
(2001) and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003) on sanctions against Al 
Qaeda, S/2003/1070 dated 3 December 2003, paragraph 58. 
48 Field auditing of charities in conflict zones is particularly difficult.  There are several reports of 
funds being diverted in the field from the intended purpose.  However, it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which such diversions were hidden from senior charity officials.  
49 Kenneth Dam, in his testimony on The Role of Charities and Non Profit Organizations in the 
Financing of Terrorism before the Senate Subcommittee On International Trade and Finance, 
August 1, 2002, listed several charities formed with the principal intention of raising funds for 
al Qaeda.  Two examples he cited were the Afghan Support Committee, and The Revival of 
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Some of these charities' defenders argue that support for the teaching and 
preaching of radical Islamic theology or jihadism is not enough to link them to 
terrorism.50  It is difficult to establish the necessary evidence to support criminal 
action against them. Nevertheless, the importance that several Islamic-based 
charities play in the overall framework of terrorism financing and support 
provides the imperative that they be closely scrutinized and held accountable.51      
Charity-Business Linkages 
There is an interesting nexus between businesses and the charities they 
have used.  These charities provide al Qaeda’s deep-pocket-donors deniability, 
protecting them from charges of knowingly financing terrorist organizations.  
The charities also provide an ideal conduit to mask the transfer of funds to al 
Qaeda.  On the other hand it is not uncommon for large and small Islamic 
charities alike to own and control their own businesses in order to use these 
unregulated funds as they please.  These businesses may have also been used 
to fund al Qaeda through their own charities52.  
 
Several charity/business networks were identified in the course of post-
9/11 investigation and enforcement efforts. 53  Operation Green Quest 
uncovered such links in its investigation of Yassin al Qadi and his involvement 
with BMI, the Arabic Beit ul Mal, or House of Finance.  Green Quest established 
that there were links between BMI and an Islamic charity called Mercy 
International.  Mercy, in turn, was tied in with al Taqwa and was implicated in 
several al Qaeda operations, including the bombing of American embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania.54 
                                                                                                                                                 
Islamic Heritage Society.  Both defrauded donors by falsely publicizing the organizations actual 
activities. 
50 See Testimony of Dr. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Rhodes College on The Role of Charities and Non 
Profit Organizations in the Financing of Terrorism before the Senate Subcommittee On 
International Trade and Finance, August 1, 2002. 
51 The 9/11 Commission Staff Monograph on Terrorism Financing addresses some of the 
dilemmas associated with closing down charities and freezing their assets in its discussion of 
the Illinois Charity Cases.  See The 9/11 Commission Report and National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Monograph on Terrorist Financing, 87 – 113. 
52 Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo 
and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A 
Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
53 Ibid. 
54 “At the New York trial of four men convicted of involvement in the embassy attacks, a former 
al-Qaeda member named several charities as fronts for the terrorist group, including Mercy. 
Documents presented at the trial demonstrated that Mercy smuggled weapons from Somalia 
into Kenya, and Abdullah Mohammad, one of the Nairobi bombers, delivered eight boxes of 
convicted al-Qaeda operative Wadi el-Hage's belongings—including false documents and 
passports—to Mercy's Kenya office.” Matthew A. Levitt, Hearings on “The Role of Charities and 
NGOs in the Financing of Terrorist Activities, House Subcommittee on International Trade and 
Finance, August 1, 2002. 
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An investigation into the activities of a number of Saudi and other 
Middle Eastern businessmen working out of Herndon, Virginia unveiled a 
network of some 100 intertwined companies and charities funding al Qaeda 
and other terrorist  groups. 55  These included Islamic educational, cultural and 
charitable organizations, as well as for-profit business and investment firms.  
Most of the educational and charitable organizations were “paper” 
organizations, all registered at a common address, but having no apparent 
physical structure.  This network became known as the Safa Group56  .  
 
In the United States, the Safa Group was closely associated with the 
SAAR Foundation, a charity funded by Saudi billionaire Salaeh Abdul Aziz-al 
Rajhi with branches in both Canada and the United States.   Evidence showed 
that the Safa Group, using the various affiliated charities and companies under 
its control, transferred money in convoluted transactions designed to prevent 
investigators from tracking the ultimate recipients. Obtained evidence 
suggested that these recipients included al Qaeda, Hamas and other associated 
terrorist groups.57 
Examples of Terrorist Exploitations of Charities—Hamas-Type 
Hamas58 raises tens of millions of dollars per year throughout the world 
using charitable fundraising as cover. While Hamas may provide money for 
legitimate charitable work, this work is a primary recruiting tool for the 
organization's militant causes. Hamas relies on donations from Palestinian 
expatriates around the world and private benefactors located in moderate Arab 
states, Western Europe and North America. Hamas uses a web of charities to 
facilitate funding and to funnel money. Charitable donations to non-
governmental organizations are commingled, moved between charities in ways 
that hide the money trail, and are then often diverted or siphoned to support 
terrorism. 
 
The political leadership of Hamas directs its terrorist networks just as 
they oversee their other activities. Hamas leader Yassin confirms this 
relationship, stating to al-Sharq al-Awsat on August 12, 2002: "When we make 
decisions on the political level and convey them to the military wing, it abides 
                                                 
55 Victor Comras, “Al Qaeda Finances and Funding to Affiliated Groups,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo 
and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A 
Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
56 See Affidavit of David Kane re In The Matter of Searches Involving 555 Grove Street, Herndon, 
Virginia and Related Locations, US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria 
Division, October (2003). 
57 Ibid. 
58 This section draws heavily on: Quotes from U.S. Treasury, “Protecting Charitable 
Organizations: Additional Background Information on Charities Designated Under Executive 
Order 13224. http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-
issues/protecting/charities_execorder_13224-a.shtml 
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by it normally.” The intensity of this relationship is reflected in Yassin's words 
quoted by Reuters on May 12, 1998: “We can not separate the wing from the 
body. If we do so, the body will not be able to fly. Hamas is one body.”59 
 
Fundraising may involve community solicitation in the United States, 
Canada, Europe and the Middle East or solicitations directly to wealthy donors. 
While some donors may be aware of the intended use of their donations, too 
many innocent donors who intend for their money to be used to provide 
humanitarian services here or abroad, are unwittingly funding acts of violence 
when these funds are diverted to terrorist causes.  The following cases illustrate 
some of the techniques used by Hamas’ main charities.60 
Al Aqsa Foundation 
Al Aqsa is a critical part of Hamas' terrorist support infrastructure. 
Through its headquarters in Germany and branch offices in the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Pakistan, South Africa, Yemen and elsewhere, Al 
Aqsa funnels money collected for charitable purposes to Hamas terrorists. Ali 
Muqbil, the General Manager of the AL-Aqsa Foundation in Yemen and a 
Hamas official, transferred funds to Hamas, PIJ or other Palestinian 
organizations assisting "Palestinian fighters." The disbursements were recorded 
as contributions for charitable projects. Through channels such as this, AL-
MUAYAD reportedly provided more than U.S. $3 million to the "Palestinian 
cause".61 The organization has also allegedly provided money, arms, recruits 
and communication equipment for Al-Qaida.  
The “Martyr’s Organization” (Bonyad-e Shahid) 
The “Martyr’s Organization” (Bonyad-e Shahid)62  admittedly supplies 
charitable funds for the families of suicide bombers.  In 2001, Paraguayan 
police searched the home of Hezbollah operative Sobhi Mahmoud Fayad in the 
the Tri-Border Area where Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay meet.  Searching 
Fayad’s home, police found receipts from the Martyr’s Organization totaling 
                                                 
59 Quotes from U.S. Treasury, “Protecting Charitable Organizations: Additional Background 
Information on Charities Designated Under Executive Order 13224. 
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/charities_execorder_13224-
a.shtml 
60 The following section draws on Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Financing the Party of 
God,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of Terrorism 
Finance and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
Forthcoming 2006). 
61 U.S. Treasury “U.S. Freezes Assets of Al-Aqsa, Citing Terror Links,”  May 29, 2003. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2004/Jan/07-474588.html 
62 The following section draws on Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Financing the Party of 
God,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of Terrorism 
Finance and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
Forthcoming 2006). 
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more than $3.5 million for donations Fayad sent.63  Authorities believed Fayad 
had sent over $50 million to Hezbollah since 1995.     
The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Developmen (HLF)t 
The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) was 
designated under Executive Orders 13224 and 12947 as a charity that provided 
millions of dollars of material and logistical support to Hamas. HLF, originally 
known as the Occupied Land Fund, was established in California in 1989 as a 
tax-exempt charity. In 1992, HLF relocated to Richardson, Texas. It had offices 
in California, New Jersey, and Illinois, and individual representatives scattered 
throughout the United States, the West Bank, and Gaza.  
 
In the year 2000 alone, HLF raised over $13 million. HLF supported 
Hamas activities through direct fund transfers to its offices in the West Bank 
and Gaza that are affiliated with Hamas and transfers of funds to Islamic 
charity committees ("zakat committees") and other charitable organizations that 
are part of Hamas or controlled by Hamas members. Mousa Mohamed Abu 
Marzook, a political leader of Hamas, provided substantial funds to the Holy 
Land Foundation in the early 1990s. In 1994, Marzook (who was named a 
Specially Designated Terrorist by the Treasury Department in 1995) designated 
HLF as the primary fund-raising entity for Hamas in the United States. HLF 
funds were used by Hamas to support schools that served Hamas ends by 
encouraging children to become suicide bombers and to recruit suicide 
bombers by offering support to their families. HLF and several of its directors 
were indicted on criminal charges in July 2004. 
Interpal/The Palestinian Relief and Development Fund 
Interpal, headquartered in the UK, has been a principal charity utilized to 
hide the flow of money to Hamas. Reporting indicates it is the conduit through 
which money flows to Hamas from other charities, e.g., the Al Aqsa 
Foundation, and that it oversees the activities of other charities. For example, 
the Sanabil Association for Relief and Development represents Interpal in 
Lebanon. Interpal is the fundraising coordinator of Hamas, a coordination point 
for other Hamas-affiliated charities. This role is of the type that includes 
supervising activities of charities, developing new charities in targeted areas, 
instructing how funds should be transferred from one charity to another, and 
even determining public relations policy. 
                                                 
63 Mark S. Steinitz, “Middle East Terrorist Activity in Latin America,” Policy Papers on the 
Americas, Vol. XIV, Study 7, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2003. 
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Other Charities Providing Support to Hamas 
According to a declassified research report64 based on Israeli intelligence, 
Hezbollah also receives funds from charities that are not directly tied to it but 
are radical Islamist organizations that donate to it out of ideological affinity.  
“Besides operating a worldwide network of fundraisers, funds are also raised 
through so-called ‘charity funds.’  Some of these are extremist Islamic 
institutions that, while not directly connected to Hezbollah, support it, albeit 
marginally, in view of their radical Islamic orientation.”   
 
While some of these funds undoubtedly pay for Hezbollah’s military and 
terrorist operations, other funds enable the group to provide its members with 
day jobs, to drape itself in a veil of legitimacy, and to build grassroots support 
among not only Shi’a, but also Sunni and Christian Lebanese.  For example, 
Hezbollah runs the al Janoub hospital in the southern Lebanese city of 
Nabatiyah.  It is one out of a network of some fifty hospitals the group runs 
throughout the country.  The hospital receives $100,000 a month from 
Hezbollah and is run by Ahmad Saad, the hospital director who is also a 
member of Hezbollah’s “national health committee.”65  
Assessment 
Based on the information contained in the cases noted above, together 
with the experience gained in monitoring Islamic charities several tentative 
policy conclusions can be drawn:  
 
First, Islamic charities are very difficult to attack.  As the UN Monitoring 
Group notes, there is a66 
 
General reticence to act against charities, even those 
suspected of channeling funds to Al-Qaeda, unless strong 
evidence is presented and judicial findings can be obtained. 
This higher standard of proof has inhibited the designation of 
charities and their inclusion in the list . . . Even when such 
charities have been listed there has been an even stronger 
reticence to go behind the charities, to reach to their directors, 
donors and fund-raisers.  
                                                 
64 Cited by Matthew Levitt. The following section draws heavily on Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah 
Finances: Financing the Party of God,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The 
Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
65 Scott Wilson, “Lebanese Wary of a Rising Hezbollah,” The Washington Post, December 20, 
2004, A17. 
66 Second report of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1363 (2001) 
and extended by resolutions 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003), on sanctions against Al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban and individuals and entities associated with them S/2003/1070, 2 December 
2003, 13, p. 15. 
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 Second, the humanitarian nature of most of these charities and service 
organizations places their offices and employees on the ground in conflict 
zones of particular interest to terrorist organizations without raising undue 
suspicion. 67  
 
Third, charities provide an outlet not only for raising significant amounts 
of money, but, even more critically, are ideal vehicles for laundering and 
transferring those and other funds.  
 
Fourth, charities not only serve as the perfect cover for terrorist 
operatives they employ, by sending the funds through recipient service 
organizations they offer simple and extremely secure means of laundering 
funds and shielding the ultimate end-users from scrutiny. For example, funds 
raised by Hamas and wire-transferred abroad may be traced to a specific 
Hamas-run charity in the West Bank or Gaza, but the cash disbursements 
delivered by courier to Hamas operatives are impossible to follow without 
extremely strong intelligence - usually of the more rare human (HUMINT) 
variety. 68 
 
Fifth, terrorist financial support structures are not static targets. Even 
when they have been included on the United Nations list, Islamic charities have 
adapted in a variety of ways. In some cases, the head office has closed but 
branch operations continue to operate unhindered.  In other cases, the 
charities have simply re-registered and re-opened under new names but with 
the old infrastructure intact. Another approach has been to support terrorists 
less through direct contributions than through logistic support (such as 
employment in a charity branch office).69  
 
In other words, the charities have displayed a degree of resilience and a 
capacity for adaptation, limiting thereby the ability of the international 
community and the United States to inhibit their continued involvement in 
terrorist financing.  Of course, the international strategy to combat terrorist 
financing has had some impact. Clearly such financing is more problematic 
than it was, and funds from these charities are neither as plentiful nor as easily 
moved as in the past. 70     
 
                                                 
67 Matthew Levitt, “Charitable Organizations and Terrorist Financing: A War on Terror Status-
Check,” March 19, 2004 
68 Ibid. 
69 See Matthew Levitt,  “Charitable Organizations and Terrorist Financing: A War on Terror 
Status-Check” Draft Paper Presented at the University of Pittsburgh Workshop on the 
Dimensions of Terrorist Financing, March 19-20, 2004. 
70 Phil Williams, “Warning Indicators and Terrorist Finances,” in  Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold 
A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A 
Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
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Unfortunately, terrorist organizations themselves have also compensated 
with their own form of adaptability and emergent behavior.  They have 
appropriated the practices of organized crime and used these new sources of 
funding to make up the shortfalls in funding from the charities. Kidnapping, 
extortion, drug trafficking, other forms of smuggling, credit card theft and 
fraud, document fraud, and robbery have thus become staple features of the 
terrorist fund-raising repertoire.  
 
Al-Qaeda has not doubt been the most successful of the terrorist 
organizations at exploiting Islamic charities and non governmental 
organizations.  NGOs.  The organization has penetrated several hundred 
madrassas (Islamic schools), mosques, and NGOs engaged in Islamic education, 
promotion of human rights, and health and relief projects.  These Islamic NGOS 
form a visible part of a much larger invisible network.  As the sections above 
show, the infiltration of these groups by Al-Qaeda and its associates poses both 
a significant threat to Islamic NGOs and at the same time one of the main 
challenges facing the security and intelligence community in combating 
terrorism.  Before coming under increased scrutiny prior to 9/11, Al-Qaeda 
either established or infiltrated Islamic NGOs for four principal reasons:71  
 
1. One-fifth of all NGOs conducting humanitarian work world-wide are 
Islamic.  Such charities have established an active presence in every 
country in the world with a sizeable Muslim population.  In addition 
to providing excellent cover and global reach, Islamic NGOs enable al-
Qaeda to radicalize and mobilize Muslim communities to support its 
aims. 
 
2. These organizations receive and disburse several billion dollars per 
year.  According to the U.S. Embassy in Riyadh Saudi donations to 
Islamic NGOs for relief in Bosnia alone in 1994 amounted to 150 
million dollars .Aiding Muslims in distress is a religious duty, while 
the idea of helping the needy and defending Muslims from perceived 
or actual persecution appeals to the vast majority of Muslims.  
 
3. Most Muslims make donations on the basis that they charity of 
choice is funding relief, education, health or development objectives.  
However, an unusually high proportion of Islamic NGOs include 
military arid as part of a humanitarian package.  The CIA estimates 
that one-third “support terrorist groups or employ individuals who 
are suspected of having terrorist connections.” 
 
                                                 
71 “Al-Qaida Finances Lubricate Islamic NGOs,” Oxford Analytica, January16, 2002 
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4. Neither the authorities nor donors are able to determine or control 
the ultimate beneficiaries of contributions, especially if they are 
overseas.  For instance, Saudi Arabia monitors NGOs in the kingdom 
closely but the ultimate destination of the funds they raised cannot 
be established by the local authorities alone.  However unless there is 
a direct and immediate threat to domestic stability or to important 
overseas relationships, governments  are unlikely to develop a 
framework for closer monitoring. 
 
Saudi Arabia, the most important home country for many of the 
charities suspected of enabling terrorist activity has come under considerable 
criticism in its attempts to control terrorist exploitation of its charities. 72 
Assessing the Saudi situation is especially difficult because reliable figures on 
the amount of money originating in or passing through Saudi Arabia and 
ending up in terrorist hands generally are difficult to obtain for a number of 
reasons:73 
 
1. Relatively small amounts of money required for terrorist acts can 
easily pass unnoticed.  
 
2. The structure of the Saudi financial system makes financial transfers 
difficult to trace.  Personal income records are not kept for tax 
purposes in Saudi Arabia and many citizens prefer cash transactions. 
 
3. Contributions to the charities are often given anonymously, and 
donated funds may be diverted from otherwise legitimate charities. 
 
4. Saudi funding of international Islamic charities is reportedly derived 
from both public and private sources which in some cases appear to 
overlap, further complicating efforts to estimate the amounts 
involved and to identify the sources and end recipients of these 
donations. 
 
Like many areas and actions in the war on terror, there are positives and 
negatives.  
 
 The country has undertaken a number of measures to try and control 
such funding. The country has also taken steps to systemically protect its 
                                                 
72 See Panel I of the Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in 
the War on Terror?” November 8, 2005. 
73 Alfred Prados and Christopher Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, March 1, 2005). 
DRAFT – November 28, 2005 NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION –  
26 of 48 
charitable sector. Since May 2003, the following regulations have been put in 
place:74 
 
1. Enhanced customer identification requirements apply to charitable 
accounts; 
 
2. Each charity must consolidate its banking activity in one principal 
account; 
 
3. No cash disbursements are permitted from charitable accounts; 
payments are only allowed by check payable to the first beneficiary 
and must be deposited in a Saudi bank; 
 
4. No ATM or credit cards may be issued against a charitable account 
(all outstanding ATM and credit cards for such accounts have been 
canceled); and 
 
5. No transfers from charitable accounts are permitted outside of Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
In addition charities in the Kingdom cannot collect cash donations in 
public places.  
 
In a related action the Saudi Arabia has implemented the 40 
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of the G-8 on 
money laundering and the 8 recommendations on terror financing.  FATF 
conducted a mutual evaluation of the Kingdom’s mechanisms in the fall of 
2003 and found them in line with international standards.  The country is a full 
member of FATF. 
 
Finally, the Kingdom is in the process of establishing a National 
Commission for Charitable Activities Abroad through which all private 
charitable activities will take place. Until such time as this commission is 
established, no Saudi charity can send funds abroad.  
 
 Critics of Saudi efforts however are quick to point out that while many 
of these things look good on paper implementation has been a problem, as 
noted at a recent Senate hearing on Saudi Arabia and the War on Terror. 75   
 
                                                 
74 Testimony of Daniel Glaser, Senate Judiciary Hearing, “Saudi Arabia and The War on Terror,” 
November 8, 2005. 
75 See Panel I of the Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in 
the War on Terror?” November 8, 2005. 
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There are problems still remaining, though, and one of the most 
important problems is that Saudi Arabia still has not created their 
charities commission, which they've been talking about for a while, 
which is supposed to bring some structure and order to the way they 
oversee their charities, and we're waiting for that. And I think the second 
and equally important issue is some of their very largest charities, the 
IRO and WAMY, which currently fall outside of their charitable 
regulations, need to be included. And I think until we see those types of 
reforms not only put into place but truly implemented, it will continue to 
be a concern of ours and something that we will continue to be pressing 
the Saudis on. 
 
The fact remains that by some estimates, Saudi Arabia pumped some 
$75 billion dollars into fundamentalist – Wahhabi Islam over the last 4 decades.  
Intended or not these funds have also provided the seed money for al Qaeda 
and associated jihadi cells around the world.  The line from Wahhabism to 
Jihadism is a very thin one, and easily crossed religiously and intellectually. Alex 
Alexiv goes even further noting that:76 
 
I start with the premise that without the huge amounts of Saudi money 
spending the past few decades, this infrastructure of Islamic extremism – 
and in fact, our problem with terrorism – would not be anywhere as 
acute as it currently is.  This money is the lifeline of terrorism. 
 
Cordesman77 largely supportive of the Saudi efforts at trying to control 
charities still has some severe reservations over the effectiveness of the 
Kingdom (or other governments in the region for  matter) in to significantly 
stopping the flow of funds from Islamic charities to terrorist organizations:   
 
Saudi Arabia can still do more to fight terrorist financing -- although US 
Treasury experts have come to praise Saudi cooperation when they 
initially condemned it. We should understand, however, that 
governmental efforts to control terrorist financing have sharp limits, and 
have probably reached the point of diminishing returns. 
 
Levitt states the problem for succinctly:78 
 
Institution building aside, Saudi officials have yet to reeducate their 
society regarding the fact that charity supported in fulfillment of a 
                                                 
76 Alex Alexiv, “Saudi Arabia: Exporting Radicalism” in Confronting Terrorism Financing 
(Washington: American Foreign Policy Council, 2005), p. 38.    
77 Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror,” Saudi-US Relations 
Information Service, November 8, 2005, p.8. 
78 Matthew Levitt, “Charity Begins in Riyadh,” Weekly Standard, February 2, 2004. 
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religious duty can be used for nefarious purposes. Nor has there been 
any effort to instill a sense of personal responsibility concerning where 
charitable donations end up. 
 
 In sum, attempts at limiting charity-based funding of terrorism has been 
more difficult than perhaps initially anticipated. Many charity-terrorist links 
have been uncovered.  However many of these tainted charities remain 
associated with the major Islamic umbrella organizations headquartered in 
Saudi Arabia, such as the World Muslim League and the International Islamic 
Relief Organization (IIRO).  These organizations have branches worldwide and 
continue to provide key funding for radical Islamic and jihadi teachings. 
 
It is not uncommon for Islamic charities to run and own their own 
businesses. And there is almost no oversight as to how they use these funds. 
There is also a nexus between businesses and the charities they use to mask 
their terrorism related funding.79 
Factors Affecting the Growth in Islamic Charity Funding 
In, part the adaptability of terrorist organizations in exploiting charities  
has been encouraged by the inability of the U.S., the European Union, and 
international financial institutions failure to adopt a common set of anti-
terrorist polices, including similar regulatory frameworks, scope of groups 
targeted, and responses and penalties. No doubt this encourages jurisdiction 
shopping by terrorists and their financial supporters. If US counter-terrorism 
legislation is tougher than Europe's post 9/11, then the incentive is for groups 
to migrate to the less stringent jurisdiction, Similarly, the failure to achieve a 
common response at the global level may encourage terrorists to structure 
their financial support activities to exploit jurisdiction-specific advantages, such 
as the network of Gulf charities in the Middle East, and weak financial 
regulation in key states in Africa and Southeast Asia. 80 
 
 As for the future, there are many variables that will determine the role 
and nature of Islamic charities in assisting terrorism.  Clearly the manner in 
which terrorist organizations themselves evolve will largely define the role of 
Islamic charities.  In this regard the 9/11 Commission notes81 
 
Though progress apparently has been made, terrorists have shown 
considerable creativity in their methods of moving money.  If al Qaeda is 
                                                 
79 Cictor Comras, Talking Paper, War on Terrorism Financing: The Counterterrorism Blog Conference, 
September 28, 2005. 
80 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorist Finance and 
State Responses,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The Political Economy of 
Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
81 9/11 Commission, p. 383. 
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replaced by smaller, decentralized terrorist groups, the premise behind 
the government’s efforts – that terrorists need a financial support 
network—may be outdated.  Moreover, some terrorist operations do not 
rely on outside sources of money and may now be self funding either 
through legitimate employment or low-level criminal activity. 
 
Realistically, terrorist organizations will not be self-financing in the 
foreseeable future.  In this case, both the supply of funds to Islamic charities 
and terrorist organization demand for external funding will determine the 
extent to which Islamic charities facilitate terrorist acts,  and recruitment.  The 
more important supply-demand elements are summarized in Figure 2.   
 
Conceptually, one can break these factors into two components: those 
that result in the overall growth of Islamic charities, and a second set that 
affects the share of these resources diverted to terrorist activities.  In actual 
practice this distinction may not be so sharp.  In part this stems from the 
simple fact that Islamic charities are hardly homogenous.  In many cases 
charities are a mere sham that exists simply to funnel money to terrorists.  
However, often the abuse of charity has occurred without the knowledge of 
donors, or even of members of the management and staff of the charity itself.   
 
Everything else equal, the growth of charities not under the direct 
control of terrorists should be higher, the more wealth occurring to 
contributors, and the charitable needs. Those charities under control by 
terrorist organizations should grow more rapidly with increased difficulty of 
shifting funds through the conventional financial system – i.e. the success of 
FATIF surveillance. Within this framework, several points are of particular 
interest.  
 
First, the extent to which the oil boom in the Gulf region continues will have 
the greatest effect on the influx of funds to Islamic charities.  The U.S. Department of 
Energy notes82 that for Saudi Arabia the combination of relatively high oil prices and 
exports led to a surge in oil revenues. For the year as a whole, Saudi Arabia earned 
about $116 billion in net oil export revenues, up 35% from 2003 revenue levels.  
 
Saudi net oil export revenues are forecast to increase in 2005 and 2006, to 
$150 billion and $154 billion, respectively, mainly due to higher oil prices. This is 
important for Saudi Arabia, given that oil export revenues account for nearly 90% of 
the country's total export earnings. Increased oil prices -- and revenues -- since the 
price collapse of 1998 have significantly improved Saudi Arabia's economic situation, 
with real GDP growth of 7.2% in 2003, 5.5% in 2004, and forecasts of 5.6% and 4.7% 
growth for 2005 and 2006, respectively.83 
 
                                                 
82 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/orevcoun.html#Saudi 
83 Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Fourty-Fiorst Annual Report 1426H (2005G), Riyadh: SAMA, 2005 
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To get a rough idea of the vast amounts of money flowing out of the Middle 
East with the current oil boom, net official outflows of capital in 2002 were only 5.5 $ 
billion.  These increased to 44.6 $ billion in 2003, further to 49.2 $ billion in 2004, and 
are expected to increase to $61.6 billion in 2005 with little sign of a sharp fall-off over 
the next several years.  These figures largely reflect the affluence in the Gulf Region.  A 
similar pattern characterizes private capital outflows.  These were in the 2-4 $billion 
range in 2003 and 2004, but have increased to 21 $billion in 2004 and were projected 
at $31.2 $ billion in 2005. 84  Again, these are expected to stabilize in this range over 
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The surge in government revenues and personal incomes in Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf countries should result in a corresponding influx of funds, both public and 
private into Islamic charities.  As Cordesman notes:  
 
Individuals in Saudi Arabia, and many other Arab and Islamic countries, will 
continue to support such organizations or their fronts, and regional 
governments can only do so much to limit such funding. Merrill Lynch 
estimates that the capital controlled by wealthy individuals in the Middle East 
rose by 29% during 2003-2004, to a level of approximately $1 trillion dollars 
raises serious questions about how much governments can do. Much of this 
capital is in private accounts outside the region, terrorist operations are only 
moderately expensive, and Merrill Lynch projects a further 9% annual rise in 
such holdings from 2004 to 2009.85 
 
Second, increasing natural disasters in the Middle East/South Asia region in   
2005 saw a massive flow of funds into charities to help with the humanitarian crisis 
associated with the Asian Tsunami and then the devastating Pakistan earthquake. 
While there are no comprehensive estimates on the exact amount of additional funds 
placed in charities following these events, there is not doubt the amounts were 
considerable, with antidotal accounts suggesting many Islamic charities awash with 
funds. 
  
Third increasing effectiveness against money laundering through commercial 
banks is likely to result in increased use of charities as a conduit to terrorist groups. On 
the other hand the effectiveness of U.S. efforts at identifying links between Islamic 
charities in the U.S. and terrorist groups has reduced flows to charities linked to 
terrorist groups as well as the ability of other compliant U.S. based charities to attract 
donations.  However there is no reason to suppose that this action in the U.S. has 
reduced the actual amount of funds reaching terrorist groups from Islamic charities in 
the Middle East. In fact, one can easily design scenarios whereby these actions cause 
more money to flow to  Islamic charities in the Middle East where the U.S. has much 
less oversight.  
 
Given the large pool of funds in Islamic Charities potentially available for 
diversion to terrorist groups, several key factors are likely to affect the actual amounts 
received by those groups.   
 
Rachel Ehrenfeld86 contends corruption is a critical variable in effecting the 
flows of funds to terrorist groups. Unfortunately Saudi Arabia and many of the key 
countries in the region have some of the highest rates of corruption in the world as 
measured by Transparency International87, a leading authority on identifying 
corruption.  Saudi Arabia ranked 71st in 2004t (that is there are 70 countries less 
corrupt) and was 70th in 2005..  Other key counties in the region are even more 
                                                 
85 Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror,” Saudi-US Relations 
Information Service, November 8, 2005, p.8. 
86 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed—and How to Stop it (Chicago: Bonus 
Books, 2003).  To be discussed in more detail in the section below on Iraq 
87 http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2004/2004.10.20.cpi.en.html 
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corrupt: Egypt 77, Iran 87 and Libya 108th. Significantly these same countries have 
shown little improvement overt the years. As will be discussed in more detail below, 
Iraq has one of the highest levels of corruption in the world, falling to 137th in 2005 
from 129 in 2004. 
 
In terms of political will, there is also little to be encouraged about.  As noted, 
in response  to U.S pressure to regulate its charities, Saudi Arabia set up, together with 
the US the Joint Terror Financing Task Force.  As on observer has noted: 
 
Has it been effective? I would submit to you that based on the declared 
objectives of insuring transparency and regulating the activities of charities in 
the Kingdom, there is still a lot of work to do on the part off the Saudis. There 
have been some positive steps taken by the Saudis, but in the larger mix of 
things, the Joint Task Force has been a relative failure.  This is due in large part 
to the fact that in order for the Joint Task Force to succeed, Saudi Arabia would 
have to effectively renounce its Wahhabist religious ideology.  Its ideology 
drives its religious institutions, which in turn drive its funding of radical Islam.  
In the United States, Wahhabisgt Saudi tracts and publications continue to be 
exported here to mosques, Islamic centers, prisons, the US military, and radical 
Islamic groups that operate under false vaneer as “civil rights” and “charitable” 
organizations.  Accused terror financiers Wael Jalaidan and Yassim Al Qadi 
continue to operate  with total impunity despite (false) assurances by Saudi 
officials that their terrorist careers had been shut down, or that they had been 
put under house arrest. 
 
A recent statement88 by Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Islamic Affairs, 
Endowments, Dawa and Guidance, Saleh ibn Abdul Aziz Al-Sheikh provides 
added cause for concern over Saudi Arabia’s resolve to close charities aiding 
terrorism.  Toward theend of 2004 the Minister told an audience in Jeddah that 
al Haramain was closed under US pressure and not because the Saudi 
government had any "suspicions surrounding its activities." It was closed, he 
said "to serve the general interest." The ministry, he said, was not aware of any 
misconduct from the Saudi charity and had not received any documented 
information to this effect from any side. He re-assured the audience that the 
Saudi government had no plans to act against any further charities, or to take 
any additional action against al Haramain employees. They would be free, he 
said, to find employment in other charities. In the meantime, al Haramain 
international operations and assets, he said, would be folded into a new body 
named the Saudi National Commission for Charitable Works Abroad.  
 
Second, outrage at the U.S. and or Israel is a key, but intangible factor in 
effecting the supply of funds to terrorist organizations and diverting charitable 
funds towards terrorist groups.  Much of the investigation and research related 
                                                 
88 Abdul Wwahab Bashir, “Kingdom Has no Plans to Close Down Charities, “Arab News, January1, 2005. 
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to al Qaeda has dealt with its funding mechanisms and not with the motivation 
and dedication that has generated the donations.  After four decades of 
fundamentalist Islamic expansion, a good part of this dedication comes from 
radical Islamic conviction and its associated absence of tolerance towards other 
ethnic or religious customs and beliefs. It has generated a growing resentment 
and alienation toward Western cultural influence in the Muslim world.  
 
 The stagnant Israeli-Palestinian situation and the war in Iraq have also 
served as motivations for recruitment and support of a new generation of al 
Qaeda-related jihadists. As more and more of these individuals infiltrate the 
Islamic charities, rising to managerial positions, the likelihood of diversion of 
funds to terrorist activities is likely to significantly increase.  
Finally, the U.S., the European Union, and international financial 
institutions have failed to adopt common CTF policies, including similar 
regulatory frameworks, scope of groups targeted, and responses and penalties. 
There is some evidence that this may encourage jurisdiction shopping by 
terrorists and their financial supporters. If US counter-terrorism legislation is 
tougher than Europe's post 9/11, then the incentive is for groups to migrate to 
the less stringent jurisdiction. Similarly, the failure to achieve a common 
response at the global level may encourage terrorists to structure their financial 
support activities to exploit jurisdiction-specific advantages, such as the 
network of Gulf charities in the Middle East, and weak financial regulation in 
key states in Africa and Southeast Asia. 89  
 
The main implication of the factors summarized above is that the current 
U.S. policies towards Islamic charities will very likely have only a marginal 
impact at best in reducing the flow of funds toward terrorist organizations.  
Looking at the bigger picture, there are few bright spots – the charities are 
likely to have more funds and there are increasing forces and mechanisms to 
divert these funds to terrorist organizations.  There have been some successes 
at identifying and shutting down some charities, but most of these successes 
were early-on in the war on terrorism when the charities themselves or those in 
the charities diverting funds were perhaps careless or unsuspecting that they 
would come under scrutiny. 
The Case of Iraq 
Some of the patterns and forces noted in the previous section appear to 
be playing out in Iraq. Recently the U.S. House Armed Services Committee 
                                                 
89 Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorist Finance and 
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heard testimony concerning the financing of insurgent activities in Iraq.90 This is 
an interesting area of examination not just because of its importance, but also 
because it illustrates many of the factors conducive to the growth and 
effectiveness of Islamic charities in funding terrorist activity.     
Terrorist Financing 
Recently the U.S. House Armed Services Committee heard testimony 
concerning the financing of insurgent activities in Iraq.91 This is an interesting 
area of examination not just because of its importance, but also because it 
illustrates many of the factors conducive to the growth and effectiveness of 
Islamic charities in funding terrorist activity and fostering extremism leading to 
a steady increase in recruits to terrorist causes.     
 
Of course Islamic charities are not the only source of terrorist/insurgent 
funding. The funding sources and methods for the insurgency are as diverse as 
the insurgency itself, thereby presenting significant challenges.92   Funds from 
former regime elements coming into Iraq from Syria and other neighboring 
countries, oil rent based funds from wealthy private individuals in the Gulf, 
together with the contributions of Islamic charities (knowingly and 
unknowingly) and the absence of any world wide regulatory/enforcement over 
the use of charitable funds have apparently created a complex and diversified 
source of finance for terrorists and the insurgency in Iraq. 
  
More specifically, the financing challenge related to Iraqi terrorism and 
insurgency is a “complex, formal and informal multi-dimensional phenomenon 
involving external money flows and internal revenue generation and 
distribution networks. These numerous revenue generation and distribution 
structures are mostly decentralized, with different funding sources and streams 
overlapping and mutually reinforcing each other. Some networks that finance 
terrorists and insurgents are self-regenerating, especially networks and 
revenues sources that are internal to Iraq. Finally, terrorists and insurgents are 
adaptive. In the past, as we've affected one stream of financing, we've observed 
terrorists and insurgents transition to other areas in response.” 93 
 
Although hard data is hard to come by, it is all too apparent that corrupt 
members of transnational charities and non governmental organizations 
                                                 
90 “Financing of Iraqi Insurgency,” Joint Hearing of the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee and the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee, July 28, 2005. 
91 “Financing of Iraqi Insurgency,” Joint Hearing of the Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and 
Capabilities of the House Armed Services Committee and the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee, July 28, 2005. 
92 Representative Sue Kelley, op. cit. 
93 Testimony of Caleb Temple, “Financing the Iraqi Insurgency,” Testimony, House Armed 
Services Committee, July 28,2005. 
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around the region and inside Iraq continue to siphon and embezzle money for 
terrorists and insurgents. The majority of Islamic charities supporting terrorists 
effectively conceal terrorist connections and launder funds by commingling 
them with money destined for legitimate humanitarian projects. 94 
 
Another important component of funding for terrorist/insurgent comes 
from many of the mosques in Iraq, both Shi'a and Sunni.  Mosques act as a 
conduit for insurgent funding from both internal and external sources. Money 
is gathered through various means, including alms-giving. Religious leaders of 
these mosques, such as Imams, are sometimes openly sympathetic to the 
insurgency and openly espouse support for the antigovernment cause. In some 
cases, the Imam and Mullah are financially supported by the insurgent group 
using the mosque, indicating a quid pro quo relationship between insurgents 
and religious officials. 95 
 
Particularly worrisome is another growing source of terrorist funding—
criminal activity. Terrorists have access to a potentially large revenue base by 
conducting criminal activities ranging from low level crime and extortion to 
involvement in smuggling and drug trafficking.96 Increased criminal activity has 
implications beyond the direct funding of terrorist/insurgency activities. Crime 
is effectively stifling attempts to restart and expand the country’s formal 
economic sector. This in turn presents a major challenge to the Iraqi 
government – how to stop and reverse the insurgent-led deterioration of the 
economy and the vicious circle of crime-terrorism-low investment-high 
unemployment and anti-Americanism that it has created. 
 
Admittedly Iraq is an extreme case.  However an examination of the 
manner in which Islamic charities fit in to that country’s struggle with terrorism 
and the insurgency is likely to produce valuable insights at attempts to stem 
the flow of terrorist/insurgency funding.  
Corruption in Iraq 
Terrorist financing experts often contend that the major difficulties in 
combating the flow of funds from charities to terrorist groups are factors such 
as the shortage of proper regulatory and reporting controls, limited numbers of  
investigative experts, and the like.  While these factors are all to present in Iraq 
a more fundamental and overriding problem is likely posed by corruption. In 
her study of world-wide terrorist groups and their financing Rachel Ehrenfeld97 
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arrived at a similar conclusion.  While the effects of corruption vary from 
country to country, the overall mechanisms are clear.  Corruption saps the 
political will of countries to combat the many sources of terrorist financing.98  It 
is also very lucrative for underpaid or intimidated local regulators to look the 
other way when investigating charity expenditures and receipts. 
  
Iraq’s case is extreme.99 Transparency International Corporation ranks the 
country with the worst of the worst.  Iraq is listed as the most corrupt country 
in the Middle East.  The country’s current ranking is 129th out of 145 nations 
world-wide, with the incidence of  corruption actually worsening between 
2003 and 2004. 
 The rankings for 2005 are not yet compiled, but there is little reason for 
optimism.  Former Defense Minister Hazem al-Shalaan embezzled close to $500 
million in six months, audacious even by Middle Eastern standards.  Even more 
disturbing is the fact that this was money that clearly could have been used to 
arm and protect Iraq’s army and fight the insurgency. Shalaan’s colleagues in 
the electricity and transport ministries also raked off millions.100 If such blatent 
corruption this could take place in such an important ministry and one under 
intense scrutiny what type of corruption must be taking place in lower-profile 
regulatory agencies overseeing the country’s charitable activities? 
 
The extent of corruption in Iraq is best illustrated by a recent account of 
affairs in the Kurdish region – commonly considered one of the more stable 
and well run areas of Iraq: 
 
Take the case of the Iraqi Kurds.  Long championed as a model of 
liberalization, they are becoming a regional embarrassment. Rather than 
pursue democracy, the Iraqi Kurdish leadership is more consumed with 
self-enrichment.  Following Iraq’s defeat in 1991, the Kurds rose in 
rebellion against Saddam Hussein. The leader of the Kurdish Democratic 
Party, Massoud Barzani, returned to Iraqi Kurdistan with little but respect 
for his family name. Fourteen years later, his personal worth is estimated 
at close to $2 billion. Corruption and nepotism are rife. No foreign 
businessman can strike a deal in his region without entering into a 
partnership with Barzani or a favored relative.  Human rights workers in 
Irbil say they have met Kurds imprisoned for failing to pay kickbacks. 
Across the region, the Barzani family conflates government, party, and 
personal property. Local militias uphold not the rule of law but rather 
serve as Baraani’s enforcers. The Kurdish Parliament, meanwhile is 
                                                 
98 Quoted in Dan Dagoni, “The Terrorism Business,” Globes, November 6, 2003. 
99 Excellent accounts of corruption under Saddam Hussein are given in Joseph Braude, The New 
Iraq (New York: Basic Books, 2003) 
100 Michael Rubin, “The Middle East’s Real Bane: Corruption,” The Daily Star, November 18, 
2005. 
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flaccid; its power no greater than that of its Syrian or Libyan 
counterparts.101 
 
A recent analysis102 of corruption in Iraq of makes the a useful distinction 
between four types of corruption currently plaguing the country: (1) political 
corruption, (2) administrative corruption, (3) financial corruption and (4) moral 
corruption. 
 
1. Political corruption in Iraq is the main source of the country’s 
pervasive corruption, laying the institutional foundation for other 
forms of corruption.  
 
2. In particular, Iraq’s administrative corruption is an outgrowth of its 
political corruption: incompetent people are appointed for jobs 
requiring competence, the system of employment is not guided by 
the criteria of professionalism, expertise, knowledge and ability but 
instead on the principle of allegiance. In most cases the authority of 
the party overrides the authority of the government. The institutions 
of law and order are relegated to a second place. 
 
3. Financial corruption erodes transparency.  Government finances are 
squandered without accountability. Government officials transform 
to merchants and use or abuse their power and positions to further 
their own special interests. Fraud and bribery become commonplace. 
 
4. Finally, moral corruption takes a toll on honesty, integrity, truth and 
professional loyalty.  These traits are not respected and valued. 
Instead hypocrisy, deception and espionage become criteria for 
allegiance, career promotion and delegation of power.  
   
Corruption has many implications beyond the insurgency and its 
funding, yet be hampering economic reconstruction and recovery, corruption 
indirectly assists the insurgency’s ability to attract fresh recruits.  Empirical 
studies on the subject have found some striking patterns across many countries 
whereby corruption:103 
 
                                                 
101 Michael Rubin, “The Middle East’s Real Bane: Corruption,” The Daily Star, November 18, 
2005. 
102 Arbil Yekgirtu in Sorani Kurdish  weekly newspaper published by Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic 
Union, November 18, 2005.] 
103 Robert Looney, “Profiles of Corruption in the Middle East,” Journal of South Asian and 
Middle Eastern Studies XXVII:4 (Summer 2005), pp. 9-10. 
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1. Reduces investment and as a consequence reduces the rate of 
growth. Such reduction in investment is assumed to be caused by the 
higher costs and the uncertainty that corruption creates. 
 
2. Reduces expenditure on education and health, because these 
allocations do not easily lend themselves to corrupt practices on the 
part of those who make budgetary decisions. Since human capital 
has been found to be one of the main sources of long-term economic 
growth, a major cost of corruption is this foregone income. 
 
3. Increases public investment because public investment projects lend 
themselves to “kick-backs” a related “White Elephant” effect is 
notorious for diverting capital from more productive private sector 
activities. 
4. Reduces expenditure for operations and maintenance since the 
normal budgetary process makes corruption more difficult than in 
the case of normal procurement.  The effect is to lower the 
productivity of public capital, slowing private investment thus 
producing a drag on economic growth. 
 
5. Reduces tax revenue directly where bribes are paid for tax avoidance. 
If governments runs deficits to fight off the loss of revenue the loss 
of revenue, the ensuing inflation may distort and retard the pattern 
of investment. 
 
6. Reduces foreign direct investment because a corruption has the same 
effect as a tax. The less predictable the level of corruption (the higher 
is it’s variance) the greater the impact of foreign direct investment. 
 
In a similar manner corruption has taken a heavy toll on the Iraqi 
economy. Iraqi corruption has, along with the insurgency, been largely 
responsible for the deteriorating economic situation, high unemployment and 
widespread frustration. It’s interesting to note that in a recent statistical study104, 
control of corruption was the most significant variable (economic or governance) 
affecting per capita income in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region. In the last 
Iraqi election, many voters cited corruption as the main reason they voted for 
Islamic candidates.  
The Problem of Extremism  
Specifying direct links between Islamic charity activity, corruption, the 
deteriorating economic situation and a key element of insurgent/terrorist 
activity -- extremist recruitment in Iraq is also difficult simply because a 
multitude of factors are at work – some more important for certain individuals, 
                                                 
104 Ibid. pp. 1-20. 
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other factors more important for different groups.   The development of large 
numbers of extremist recruits requires at least three elements (1) lack of state 
capacity, particularly in the areas of police, intelligence, and law enforcement; 
(2) a “mobilizing belief,” such as Salafist/jihadist extremism; and (3) appropriate 
agitators who can propagate these ideas and create an effective terrorist 
force.105  Clearly (1) and (3) are present in Iraq with (2) a latent factor that 
Islamic charities are able to cultivate.   
 
While our knowledge of the extent of Islamic charities involvement in the Iraqi 
insurgency is sketchy, Chechnya provides a good case study of their likely role.106 
Evidence collected by Russian and U.S. authorities suggests that the same 
sources that financed Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan also supported the main 
Chechen commanders.  
 
Russia’s Domestic Security Agency (FSB) has identified Islamic charities 
operating in Chechnya and elsewhere in the region. Al-Haramain, for example, 
a Saudi-based charity whose assets in the United States have been frozen by 
the U.S. Treasury Department, operated for years in Russia and Chechnya, 
contributing  US$50 million to the mujahideen. In 1997, for example, Al-
Haramain financed Dagestani extremist formations "of Wahhabist orientation," 
whose objective was to overthrow the "constitutional order existing in the 
republic" and create an Islamic state in the territory of Dagestan and Chechnya.  
 
The FSB also reported that Al-Haramain sponsored the Foundation for 
Chechnya, which served as a mechanism to supply the mujahideen.[44] Al-
Haramain derived a portion of its funds for Chechen operations from American 
sources. In February 2005, a federal grand jury indicted the Ashland, Oregon 
branch of the charity and two top Al-Haramain officers for various money-
laundering offences after a lengthy U.S. Internal Revenue Service investigation 
that uncovered an alleged scheme by officers of the charity to funnel money in 
support of Chechen jihadists. 
 
The Benevolence International Foundation, a Chicago-based charity, also 
pumped money to Chechen Islamists. According to a U.S. government affidavit 
filed in a Chicago court: 
 
 In 1995, Madani al-Tayyib (then in the Sudan serving as Al-Qaida's chief 
financial officer) asked an Al-Qaida member to travel to Chechnya 
through Baku, Azerbaijan, to join with Al-Qaida in the fighting in 
Chechnya. The Al-Qaida member … was told that he would be joining 
                                                 
105 William Rosenau, “Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania,” Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 28 (2005), pp. 1-10. 
106 The following Chechnya account is based on Lorenzo Vidino, “How Chechnya Became a 
Breeding Ground for Terror,” The Middle East Quarterly XII:3 (Summer 2005). 
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up with Ibn al-Khattab, a mujahideen leader who had worked in 
Afghanistan with bin Laden. At about this time, a website used by 
Chechen mujahideen indicated that Ibn al-Khattab led the Arab 
contingent of fighters in Chechnya. BIF [Benevolence International 
Foundation] had been identified on the Internet website as conduits for 
financial support to those fighters.107 
 
Front organizations are just one of the means used by terrorists to 
smuggle cash into Chechnya. Despite their efforts to stop the money coming 
from abroad, the Russian domestic security agency reports that up to $1 
million a month in remittances from Islamists and the Chechen diaspora 
reaches Chechnya, delivered by couriers who travel through Georgia.[50] 
Donations are often sent to Chechnya through hawala108, a system used in the 
Middle East to transfer money informally through a network of couriers and 
acquaintances, and are, therefore, particularly hard to trace.109 
 
The situation in Iraq has some similarities to that in Chechnya, but differs 
due to specific factors such as ethnic conflicts, a large criminal element hold-
over from the period of sanctions, and whole spectrum of other contributing 
factors, some of which are summarized110 in Figure 3.  What is fairly certain is 
that the longer the economy remains incapable of providing viable work for 
large segments, and is seen as incapable of doing so in the future, the more 
attractive extremism will become and the more effective Islamic based charities 
in facilitating terrorist operations and recruitment.  
 
As in the case of Chechnya, Islamic charities facilitate the insurgency in 
two key ways (Figure 3) – through their direct funding and through their 
promotion of religious extremism.  In this sense they are able to capitalize on 
the widespread discontent created by corruption and economic malaise.  
 
Yet, despite their important role in supporting the insurgency, increased 
efforts to halt their funding would seem to be a waste of time and resources.  
First, without overcoming corruption, rules, regulations, and oversight of the 
charities would be futile.  Corrupt or sympathetic officials will always find a 
way to circumvent restrictions.  Second the terrorists/insurgents will simply shift 
to alternative sources of funding – some of which may make the situation even 
worse.   
                                                 
107 Government Evidentiary Proffer Supporting the Admissibility of Co-conspirator Statements,” 
United States of America v. Enaam M. Arrnout, U.S. District  Court, Northern District of Illinois, 
Eastern Division, 02-CR-892 (N.S. Ill. Filed Jan6, 2003), p. 26. 
108 Cf. Robert Looney,  Hawala: The Terrorist’s Informal Financial Mechanism,” Middle East 
Poloicy X:1 (Spring 2003), pp. 164-167. 
109 Lorenzo Vidino, op. cit. 
110 For a detailed description of the Iraqi case see Robert Looney,   Socio-Economic Strategies to 
Counter Islamic Extremism in Iraq,” Middle East Policy (forthcoming2006). 
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One notable example is the success the insurgency has had in raising 
money through criminal activity. Terrorist/insurgent attacks on the country’s 
pipelines and refinerys have created a possibility whereby unscrupulous Iraqi 
officials and oil traders together with organized criminals have the opportunity 
to make huge profits buying gasoline at the official price, and then selling it on 
the black market.111 According to an Oil Ministry report leaked to the Baghdad 
paper Al-Furat, a gas station owner selling a tanker-load of gasoline at the 
official price could expect to make IQD 500,000—about US$340—in profit 
while selling the same petrol on the black market would net more than 




Iraq: Islamic Charities, Extremism and the Insurgency 
 
                                                 
111 Cf Robert Looney, “The Business of Insurgency: The Expansion of Iraq’s Shadow Economy“ 
The National Interest 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 3-4. 
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The government has already begun to clamp down on those officials and 
gasoline station owners who are allowing the gasoline to leak into the black 
market. The distribution direction in al Amarah, south of Baghdad has been 
arrested for selling most of the governorate’s gasoline on the black market; 
three managing directors in the Oil ministry have been suspended; and several 
government-owned petrol stations closed pending investigation.  
 
However, largely outside of the government’s reach the insurgents 
continue to thrive. They control many of the distribution routes in the country. 
Leveraging this advantage they have been able to profit from the differential 
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between the official, subsidized price and the international market price for 
petrol by smuggling the fuel out of the country. This not only allows insurgents 
to raise huge amounts of money to fund their operations, but also helps them 
to inflame popular opposition to the occupation. To add insult to injury, the 
insurgents often simply sell, through various front organizations, the gasoline 
back to the government to begin another cycle. 
 
While no hard data exists on the profits earned by the insurgency 
through black market arbitrage, a safe guess is that it is likely to be in the high 
millions. The cost to the government stemming from providing subsidized 
gasoline amounts to $5 billion in lost revenues, or about $200 per person.112 
The effect on the country’s stability is two-pronged. With rising costs of 
reconstruction and security the government’s ability to fight the insurgency 
declines at the same time it is in effect subsidizing insurgent activities. Simple 
outright theft and smuggling compound the losses to the country stemming 
from black market arbitrage. CPA officials estimated in early 2004 that 
smugglers were able to steal up to $200,000 worth of oil a day. 
Policy Implications 
The lesson from this and other accounts of criminal activity it is fairly 
clear that no progress will be made in stemming the flow of Islamic charity 
funding intended for terrorist/insurgent groups in Iraq until corruption is 
brought under control.  This is not to say that the current efforts should be cut-
back or suspended.  Instead,  policymakers must realize that the charities are 
only one cog in a bigger picture, without changing the supportive 
environment, especially corruption, little can be done to stem the funding 
received by insurgents/terrorists in Iraq.   
 
 How is corruption to be reduced in Iraq?  Given corruption’s 
pervasiveness at all levels of government it is unlikely that the system is capable 
of reforming itself. On the other hand, empirical evidence from a large sample 
of countries suggests that indirect methods may produce significant results 
over time. These include various improvements in certain areas of governance113 
(voice and accountability, regulatory quality, political stability, government 
effectiveness, and rule of law) as well as improved economic freedom.114  
Statistically the sharpest patterns were found after separating countries into 
two groups: MENA (Middle East North Africa) and non-MENA.   
                                                 
112 http://www.ecoi.net/doc/en/IQ/content/9/7659-7848 
 
113 Data is from Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002 (Washington: The World Bank, June 30, 2003), p. 97. The 
complete data set and description of the measures can be found at: 
ww.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/ 
114 For the economic freedom index as well as a discussion of its key components see Index of 
Economic Freedom Rankings, (Washington: Heritage Foundation), various issues).   
DRAFT – November 28, 2005 NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION –  
44 of 48 
 
Unfortunately, the task of reducing corruption appears easier in the non-
MENA countries.  For these nations, improved government effectiveness 
appears to carry over to positive action in the control of corruption.  Improved 
voice and democracy also appear important in this regard.  By contrast, in the 
MENA region, improvements in over-all economic freedom and political 
stability appear to be the critical areas leading to improvements in the control 
of corruption.  In other words the non-MENA countries appear to undertake 
anti-corruption under a more democratic political process together with 
pressure from a more efficient governmental structure for eliminating 
corruption.  In the MENA countries, political stability appears to be critical for 
anti-corruption efforts. In this context anti-corruption is possibly seen as a 
necessary complement to maintain gains in economic freedom.  This model 
predicts well over 90 percent of the differences in corruption throughout the 
MENA region.115  
Assessment 
Clearly there are some specific areas of action that the U.S. should 
pursue in combating the impact of Islamic charities, especially those based in 
Saudi Arabia.  To the extent that Saudi Arabia and its charities are contributing 
to the financing of the insurgency, encouraging extremism and facilitating 
Saudis’ participation in the conflict, the U.S. should pressure the Saudis to:116  
 
1. Stop allowing young, male Saudi nationals who have never left home 
before from buying one-way airline tickets to Damascus, Syria 
without first being questioned by law enforcement. 
 
2. Urge Saudi Muslim clerics like Salman al-Awdah and Safar al-Hawali 
to issue a new fatwah reversing their previous ruling that judged the 
war in Iraq to be an authentic jihad mandating the participation of all 
able-bodied Muslims from across the Middle East.  Dozens of Saudi 
foreign fighters in Iraq have cited that fatwah as a prime motivating 
factor in their decision to join Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 
 
3. Carefully monitor the flow of money from individual Saudi donors 
and religious charities like the World Assembly for Muslim Youth 
(WAMY) to ensure that humanitarian efforts in Iraq are not being 
used as a cover for extreme Salafists and anti-U.S. militants. 
 
A more permanent solution, however, lies in giving anti-corruption 
efforts a high priority. Not only would an improved corruption situation aid in 
                                                 
115 Robert Looney, Profiles of Corruption in the Middle East,” op. cit. 
116 Evan Kohlmann, on the Counterterrorism Blog, November 13, 2005. 
http://counterterror.typepad.com/the_counterterrorism_blog/ 
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enforcing restrictions on charity activity and money laundering, improved 
control of corruption appears critical for moving the country up the per capita 
income ladder. If Iraq is at all similar to other countries in the region, effective 
efforts in reducing corruption should pay high dividends in inducing follow on 
improvements in other areas of governance, especially voice and accountability, 
political stability, government effectiveness, and to a lesser extent regulatory 
quality.117  Unfortunately, an improved corruption environment does not 
appear to significantly stimulate follow-on reforms in economic reforms.  
 
Clearly its problematic the extent to which reforms can or should be 
encouraged by countries outside the region. A group of first class Arab minds, 
the Project for Democracy Studies in Arab Counties, has stressed the 
importance of indigenous initiated reforms118: 
 
The sense of managing alone contrasts sharply with the attitude of most 
Arab commentators, who delight in blaming the rest of the world for 
every misfortune, real or imagined, and look to right all wrongs. The 
Oxford delegates believe that it is only Arabs themselves who can create 
the institutions in their societies that can lead them to a better future. 
 
To a certain extent, the basis for an indigenous reform process may 
already exist in Iraq as a result of the economic measures put in place in late 
2003 by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).119  These free market reforms 
have been somewhat controversial, and it is easy to argue that at least so far 
they have contributed to the economy’s sorry state.  Still by increasing the 
extent of economic freedom120 in the country, they have laid a solid foundation 
for recovery once it begins to take hold.    As noted above, in the MENA region 
control of corruption MENA appears to improve with increases in the over-all 
economic freedom score as well as improvements in political stability. Because 
improvements in the corruption situation in the MENA countries do not appear 
to stimulate follow on economic reforms there may be a very positive role for 
countries outside the region to play.  Here the United States, through 
international organizations such as the IMF, and the WTO can play an active 
role in supporting reforms – trade liberalization to comply with WTO 
agreements for example.  To the extent that a direct U.S. approach of trying to 
speed up the democratization process might cause increased political instability 
in the region, the most effective path for the U.S may well be an indirect 
multilateral one.    
                                                 
117 Cf.  Robert Looney, “Profiles of Corruption in the Middle East,” op.cit. 
118 Mai Yamani, The Middle East’s Lost Resources: Arab Blues at Oxford,” International Herald 
Tribune, September 3, 2004. 
119 Robert Looney, “Iraq’s Economic Transition: The Neoliberal Model and Its Role,” The Middle 
East Journal 57:4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 568-587. 
120 The economic freedom index is a composite of the various categories of policies towards 
foreign investment, trade policy, banking and finance and the like.  
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Implications for the Future 
The problem of aggressively confronting Islamic charities is that terrorist 
financing is a hydra–if one head gets cut off, two more appear–leaving policy 
makers always behind the power curve.  Are there other indirect measures in 
addition to those noted above that might be effective in combating charity 
based terrorist/insurgency funding?  One option is to focus not only on money, 
but on the demand driving the money.  Within such an expanded policy 
framework, funding for terror is viewed as a product of an ideology which 
must be countered. 121  
 
Inherent in this view is the assumption that as long as there is a desire 
for people to donate to radical Islamist causes, they will find a way to do so, 
even if under the guise of charitable contributions. In this line of reasoning, the 
struggle over terrorism finance boils down to a struggle of ideology, and an 
increasing number of analysts advise that until nations recognize and come to 
terms with this, they will not substantially impact terrorist financing and will 
not win the war on terror. 122  
  
Undermining the effectiveness of U.S. policies designed to combat terror 
financing is a perception that they are contrary or hostile to a central tenet of 
Islam, zakat, which requires financial contribution to Islamic causes.123 To 
counter this problem, some advocate that policy needs to facilitate channeling 
of charitable donations to non-jihadist causes; this approach would necessitate 
the identification of organizations and charities which are terrorist connected 
or terrorist fronts. On the other hand, donors need to be able to identify 
legitimate charities without terrorist connections.124  
 
Central to such efforts are better communication and greater 
government understanding of the cultural basis and operational dynamics of 
Islamic charities. For example, under a recently created Treasury Department/FBI 
                                                 
121 Raphael Perl, “Anti-Terror Strategy, The 9/11 Commission Report and Terrorism Financing: 
Implications for U.S. Policymakers,” in Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkinas eds, The 
Political Economy of Terrorism Finance and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, Forthcoming 2006). 
122 Ibid. 
123 Note, however, that funding from charity or relief organizations, though a significant source 
of funding for terrorist operations, is by no means the sole source. The 2002 National Money 
Laundering Strategy of the United States points out that terrorist groups tap into a wide range 
of sources for their financial support, including otherwise legitimate enterprises such as 
construction companies, honey shops, tanneries, banks, agricultural commodity brokers, trade 
businesses, bakeries, restaurants, and  bookstores.  The strategy also states that terrorists 
receive material assistance and/or financial support from rogue nations and other governments 
that are sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause.  See 
www.treas.gov/press/releases/docs/monlaund.pdf. 
124 Wayne Parry, “U.S. Rejects Muslims’ Plea for ‘Approved’ Charities,” Associated Press 
dispatch, October 14, 2004. 
DRAFT – November 28, 2005 NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION –  
47 of 48 
joint outreach program, agency representatives are conducting seminars in the 
Arab-American community to increase awareness of agency concerns and of 
potential pitfalls with regard to charitable donations.  There is a similar need 
internationally. 125  
 
Within this general area of indirect approaches toward combating 
Islamic support of terrorist organizations a number of promising alternatives 
have been suggested126 
 
1. Rethinking assumptions and expanding policy to include a 
demand/supply framework aimed at reducing the pool of potential 
contributors to terrorist causes, including working with those who offer 
alternatives to radical Islam and those who seek to discredit the ideology 
of radical Islamists. 
 
2. Adopting a mindset which increasingly views money as a tool of 
terrorism and as a source of information to be studied, not merely as a 
product to be seized.    
 
3. Placing more emphasis on international coalition building with much 
of the focus on diplomacy rather than on seizing assets or monitoring 
financial flows. Once built and solid, a coalition of this nature could be 
expanded into other areas of mutual interest and concern.   
 
4.  Initiating a concerted effort to assess our current knowledge of data 
on Islamic charities: (a) What data is currently available on the charities 
and their support of terrorist organizations? (2) The best way to expand 
our data base in this regard? and (3) How to apply state of the art 
technology to mine the data as a means of identifying suspicious 
patterns of activity? 
 
5. Concentrating on high-value targets: significant money, suspicious 
transactions, key financiers, charities and front groups. 
 
6. Giving the matter of state sponsorship of terror an invigorated 
priority.  To what degree is the current policy focus on al Qaeda type 
networks drawing attention away from the reported role of states such 
as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria in funding, facilitating, or countenancing 
the financing of terror?   What enticements and sanctions can the United 
States and the international community bring to bear on so-called 
“rogue” nations?   
 
                                                 
125 Raphael Perl, op. cit. 
126 Ibid. 
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7.  Developing and implementing more proactive policies.  For example, 
how might we maximize the legal right of contributors worldwide to 
demand an accounting of how charitable donations are used?  How 
might the funding of militant madrassas throughout the world better be 
discouraged? How will a terrorist organization respond to the shutting 
down of a particular source of funding, and how does one stay ahead of 
the curve? (This may include utilizing sting operations, covert actions, 
and other means against terrorist financial centers, businesses, and 
individuals engaged in facilitating terrorism through funding.)  
 
8. Devoting more policy focus to combating criminal activities–such as 
piracy of intellectual property rights, narcotics and human trafficking, 
counterfeiting, etc.–which are being used as sources of funding by 
terrorists.  
